In the first part of the seminar we’ll discuss basic elements of economic analysis of public law, known as public choice theory. In our first meeting we’ll identify two distinct public choice theories—“a public interest” approach (aka Madisonianism or “republicanism”) vs. “public of interests” view (aka “pluralism”). Under the former, decision-makers should base their decisions on “public reason” (in the Rawlsian sense) rather than on self-interest. The aim of public law is to ensure that decision-making is based on impartial considerations. In contrast, the competing theory reflects a welfarist approach, under which the desired social decisions are those that maximize some social welfare function. In general, it endorses a decentralized approach, in which the social decision is achieved by aggregating the relevant persons’ interests and preferences. Accordingly, the aim of public law under this view is to ensure that decisions accurately aggregate the various interests of those affected. We will discuss the central normative and behavioral aspects of each of these theories. In subsequent meetings we will explore some of their implementations in public choice theory and in public law doctrines, regarding four central types of decision-makers: the public, representatives, the Executive Branch and the judiciary.
teacher profile teaching materials
G. Napolitano, Diritto amministrativo e processo economico, in Dir. amm., 4, 2014.
M. D’Alberti, Diritto pubblico dei mercati e analisi economica, in Associazione italiana dei professori di diritto amministrativo – AIPDA, Convegno Analisi economica e diritto amministrativo, Venezia 28-29 settembre 2006.
M. Cafagno, La responsabilità della amministrazione pubblica, in Associazione italiana dei professori di diritto amministrativo – AIPDA, Convegno Analisi economica e diritto amministrativo, Venezia 28-29 settembre 2006.
S. Rose-Ackerman, Public Choice, Public Law and Public Policy, Keynote address, First World Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Amsterdam, March 31, 2007, Yale University.
S. Rose-Ackerman, The Economic Analysis of Public Law, European Journal of Law and Economics, 1:53--70 (1994).
Programme
In the first part of the seminar we’ll discuss basic elements of economic analysis of public law, known as public choice theory. In our first meeting we’ll identify two distinct public choice theories—“a public interest” approach (aka Madisonianism or “republicanism”) vs. “public of interests” view (aka “pluralism”). Under the former, decision-makers should base their decisions on “public reason” (in the Rawlsian sense) rather than on self-interest. The aim of public law is to ensure that decision-making is based on impartial considerations. In contrast, the competing theory reflects a welfarist approach, under which the desired social decisions are those that maximize some social welfare function. In general, it endorses a decentralized approach, in which the social decision is achieved by aggregating the relevant persons’ interests and preferences. Accordingly, the aim of public law under this view is to ensure that decisions accurately aggregate the various interests of those affected. We will discuss the central normative and behavioral aspects of each of these theories. In subsequent meetings we will explore some of their implementations in public choice theory and in public law doctrines, regarding four central types of decision-makers: the public, representatives, the Executive Branch and the judiciary.Core Documentation
G. Napolitano – M. Abrescia, Analisi economica del diritto pubblico, Bologna, il Mulino, 2009.G. Napolitano, Diritto amministrativo e processo economico, in Dir. amm., 4, 2014.
M. D’Alberti, Diritto pubblico dei mercati e analisi economica, in Associazione italiana dei professori di diritto amministrativo – AIPDA, Convegno Analisi economica e diritto amministrativo, Venezia 28-29 settembre 2006.
M. Cafagno, La responsabilità della amministrazione pubblica, in Associazione italiana dei professori di diritto amministrativo – AIPDA, Convegno Analisi economica e diritto amministrativo, Venezia 28-29 settembre 2006.
S. Rose-Ackerman, Public Choice, Public Law and Public Policy, Keynote address, First World Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Amsterdam, March 31, 2007, Yale University.
S. Rose-Ackerman, The Economic Analysis of Public Law, European Journal of Law and Economics, 1:53--70 (1994).
Reference Bibliography
G. Napolitano, Diritto amministrativo e processo economico, in Dir. amm., 4, 2014. M. D’Alberti, Diritto pubblico dei mercati e analisi economica, in Associazione italiana dei professori di diritto amministrativo – AIPDA, Convegno Analisi economica e diritto amministrativo, Venezia 28-29 settembre 2006. M. Cafagno, La responsabilità della amministrazione pubblica, in Associazione italiana dei professori di diritto amministrativo – AIPDA, Convegno Analisi economica e diritto amministrativo, Venezia 28-29 settembre 2006. S. Rose-Ackerman, Public Choice, Public Law and Public Policy, Keynote address, First World Meeting of the Public Choice Society, Amsterdam, March 31, 2007, Yale University. S. Rose-Ackerman, The Economic Analysis of Public Law, European Journal of Law and Economics, 1:53--70 (1994).Type of delivery of the course
TraditionalAttendance
Attendance is not mandatory but suggested in order to improve the study methodType of evaluation
Oral test