The course is a primer in game theory that aims to introduce students to the language and methods used to analyze static and dynamic games of complete and incomplete information. A special emphasis is posed on economic applications. Among the others, the course deals with problems concerning business strategies such as those related to the determination of sale prices and production/distribution quantities, strategies related to firm entry/exit and market positioning, bargaining, auction strategies and mechanisms, optimal policy, issues related to agents’ credibility and to the time-consistence/sustainability of their decisions.
Curriculum
teacher profile teaching materials
1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Rationalizability. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form Nozione di gioco in forma estesa. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nahs Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Mutuazione: 21210010 TEORIA DEI GIOCHI in Scienze Economiche LM-56 TIRELLI MARIO
Programme
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Rationalizability. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form Nozione di gioco in forma estesa. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nahs Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Core Documentation
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Type of delivery of the course
Class lectures, also with weakly discussions of problems and applications.Type of evaluation
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final. Both exams are written, closed books. teacher profile teaching materials
1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Rationalizability. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form Nozione di gioco in forma estesa. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nahs Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Mutuazione: 21210010 TEORIA DEI GIOCHI in Scienze Economiche LM-56 TIRELLI MARIO
Programme
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Rationalizability. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form Nozione di gioco in forma estesa. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nahs Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Core Documentation
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Type of delivery of the course
Class lectures, also with weakly discussions of problems and applications.Type of evaluation
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final. Both exams are written, closed books. teacher profile teaching materials
1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Rationalizability. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form Nozione di gioco in forma estesa. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nahs Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Mutuazione: 21210010 TEORIA DEI GIOCHI in Scienze Economiche LM-56 TIRELLI MARIO
Programme
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Rationalizability. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form Nozione di gioco in forma estesa. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nahs Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Core Documentation
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Type of delivery of the course
Class lectures, also with weakly discussions of problems and applications.Type of evaluation
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final. Both exams are written, closed books. teacher profile teaching materials
1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Rationalizability. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form Nozione di gioco in forma estesa. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nahs Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Mutuazione: 21210010 TEORIA DEI GIOCHI in Scienze Economiche LM-56 TIRELLI MARIO
Programme
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Rationalizability. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form Nozione di gioco in forma estesa. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nahs Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Core Documentation
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Type of delivery of the course
Class lectures, also with weakly discussions of problems and applications.Type of evaluation
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final. Both exams are written, closed books.