The course is a primer in game theory that aims to introduce students to the language and methods used to analyze static and dynamic games of complete and incomplete information. A special emphasis is posed on economic applications. Among the others, the course deals with problems concerning business strategies such as those related to the determination of sale prices and production/distribution quantities, strategies related to firm entry/exit and market positioning, bargaining, auction strategies and mechanisms, optimal policy, issues related to agents’ credibility and to the time-consistence/sustainability of their decisions.
Curriculum
teacher profile teaching materials
1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Rationalizability. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form Nozione di gioco in forma estesa. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nahs Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Fruizione: 21210236 Game Theory in Scienze Economiche LM-56 TIRELLI MARIO
Programme
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Rationalizability. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form Nozione di gioco in forma estesa. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nahs Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Core Documentation
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Type of evaluation
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final exam. Both exams are written, closed books. **** COVID EMERGENCY **** In the event it were impossibile to carrying out exams in our university, we shall arange them online, via Teams. Exams will have a similar format of the ones offered in person. An institutional website (http://portalestudente.uniroma3.it/accedi/area-riservata-docenti/istruzioni-docenti/esami-di-profitto/) will provide additional information on the general procedures. teacher profile teaching materials
1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Rationalizability. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form Nozione di gioco in forma estesa. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nahs Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Fruizione: 21210236 Game Theory in Scienze Economiche LM-56 TIRELLI MARIO
Programme
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Rationalizability. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form Nozione di gioco in forma estesa. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nahs Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Core Documentation
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Type of evaluation
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final exam. Both exams are written, closed books. **** COVID EMERGENCY **** In the event it were impossibile to carrying out exams in our university, we shall arange them online, via Teams. Exams will have a similar format of the ones offered in person. An institutional website (http://portalestudente.uniroma3.it/accedi/area-riservata-docenti/istruzioni-docenti/esami-di-profitto/) will provide additional information on the general procedures. teacher profile teaching materials
1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Rationalizability. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form Nozione di gioco in forma estesa. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nahs Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Fruizione: 21210236 Game Theory in Scienze Economiche LM-56 TIRELLI MARIO
Programme
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Rationalizability. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form Nozione di gioco in forma estesa. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nahs Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Core Documentation
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Type of evaluation
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final exam. Both exams are written, closed books. **** COVID EMERGENCY **** In the event it were impossibile to carrying out exams in our university, we shall arange them online, via Teams. Exams will have a similar format of the ones offered in person. An institutional website (http://portalestudente.uniroma3.it/accedi/area-riservata-docenti/istruzioni-docenti/esami-di-profitto/) will provide additional information on the general procedures. teacher profile teaching materials
1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Rationalizability. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form Nozione di gioco in forma estesa. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nahs Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Fruizione: 21210236 Game Theory in Scienze Economiche LM-56 TIRELLI MARIO
Programme
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Rationalizability. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form Nozione di gioco in forma estesa. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nahs Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Core Documentation
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Type of evaluation
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final exam. Both exams are written, closed books. **** COVID EMERGENCY **** In the event it were impossibile to carrying out exams in our university, we shall arange them online, via Teams. Exams will have a similar format of the ones offered in person. An institutional website (http://portalestudente.uniroma3.it/accedi/area-riservata-docenti/istruzioni-docenti/esami-di-profitto/) will provide additional information on the general procedures. teacher profile teaching materials
1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Rationalizability. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form Nozione di gioco in forma estesa. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nahs Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Fruizione: 21210236 Game Theory in Scienze Economiche LM-56 TIRELLI MARIO
Programme
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Rationalizability. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form Nozione di gioco in forma estesa. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nahs Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Core Documentation
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Type of evaluation
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final exam. Both exams are written, closed books. **** COVID EMERGENCY **** In the event it were impossibile to carrying out exams in our university, we shall arange them online, via Teams. Exams will have a similar format of the ones offered in person. An institutional website (http://portalestudente.uniroma3.it/accedi/area-riservata-docenti/istruzioni-docenti/esami-di-profitto/) will provide additional information on the general procedures. teacher profile teaching materials
1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Rationalizability. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form Nozione di gioco in forma estesa. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nahs Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Fruizione: 21210236 Game Theory in Scienze Economiche LM-56 TIRELLI MARIO
Programme
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Rationalizability. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form Nozione di gioco in forma estesa. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nahs Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Core Documentation
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Type of evaluation
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final exam. Both exams are written, closed books. **** COVID EMERGENCY **** In the event it were impossibile to carrying out exams in our university, we shall arange them online, via Teams. Exams will have a similar format of the ones offered in person. An institutional website (http://portalestudente.uniroma3.it/accedi/area-riservata-docenti/istruzioni-docenti/esami-di-profitto/) will provide additional information on the general procedures. teacher profile teaching materials
1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Rationalizability. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form Nozione di gioco in forma estesa. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nahs Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Fruizione: 21210236 Game Theory in Scienze Economiche LM-56 TIRELLI MARIO
Programme
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Rationalizability. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form Nozione di gioco in forma estesa. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nahs Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Core Documentation
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Type of evaluation
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final exam. Both exams are written, closed books. **** COVID EMERGENCY **** In the event it were impossibile to carrying out exams in our university, we shall arange them online, via Teams. Exams will have a similar format of the ones offered in person. An institutional website (http://portalestudente.uniroma3.it/accedi/area-riservata-docenti/istruzioni-docenti/esami-di-profitto/) will provide additional information on the general procedures. teacher profile teaching materials
1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Rationalizability. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form Nozione di gioco in forma estesa. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nahs Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Fruizione: 21210236 Game Theory in Scienze Economiche LM-56 TIRELLI MARIO
Programme
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Rationalizability. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form Nozione di gioco in forma estesa. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nahs Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Core Documentation
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Type of evaluation
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final exam. Both exams are written, closed books. **** COVID EMERGENCY **** In the event it were impossibile to carrying out exams in our university, we shall arange them online, via Teams. Exams will have a similar format of the ones offered in person. An institutional website (http://portalestudente.uniroma3.it/accedi/area-riservata-docenti/istruzioni-docenti/esami-di-profitto/) will provide additional information on the general procedures.