Curriculum
Mutuazione: 21210236 Game Theory in Scienze Economiche LM-56 TIRELLI MARIO, SALUSTRI FRANCESCO
Programme
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Core Documentation
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Type of delivery of the course
Class lectures, also with weakly discussions of problems and applications.Attendance
Three weakly lectures during the academic semesterType of evaluation
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final exam. Both exams are written, closed books.Mutuazione: 21210236 Game Theory in Scienze Economiche LM-56 TIRELLI MARIO, SALUSTRI FRANCESCO
Programme
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Core Documentation
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Type of delivery of the course
Class lectures, also with weakly discussions of problems and applications.Type of evaluation
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final exam. Both exams are written, closed books.Mutuazione: 21210236 Game Theory in Scienze Economiche LM-56 TIRELLI MARIO, SALUSTRI FRANCESCO
Programme
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Core Documentation
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Type of delivery of the course
Class lectures, also with weakly discussions of problems and applications.Attendance
Three weakly lectures during the academic semesterType of evaluation
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final exam. Both exams are written, closed books.Mutuazione: 21210236 Game Theory in Scienze Economiche LM-56 TIRELLI MARIO, SALUSTRI FRANCESCO
Programme
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Core Documentation
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Type of delivery of the course
Class lectures, also with weakly discussions of problems and applications.Type of evaluation
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final exam. Both exams are written, closed books.Mutuazione: 21210236 Game Theory in Scienze Economiche LM-56 TIRELLI MARIO, SALUSTRI FRANCESCO
Programme
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Core Documentation
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Type of delivery of the course
Class lectures, also with weakly discussions of problems and applications.Attendance
Three weakly lectures during the academic semesterType of evaluation
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final exam. Both exams are written, closed books.Mutuazione: 21210236 Game Theory in Scienze Economiche LM-56 TIRELLI MARIO, SALUSTRI FRANCESCO
Programme
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Core Documentation
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Type of delivery of the course
Class lectures, also with weakly discussions of problems and applications.Type of evaluation
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final exam. Both exams are written, closed books.Mutuazione: 21210236 Game Theory in Scienze Economiche LM-56 TIRELLI MARIO, SALUSTRI FRANCESCO
Programme
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Core Documentation
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Type of delivery of the course
Class lectures, also with weakly discussions of problems and applications.Attendance
Three weakly lectures during the academic semesterType of evaluation
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final exam. Both exams are written, closed books.Mutuazione: 21210236 Game Theory in Scienze Economiche LM-56 TIRELLI MARIO, SALUSTRI FRANCESCO
Programme
Part I – Games of complete information.1. Static games: Normal form games. Solution concepts. Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies. Dominance solvable games. Applications.
2. Dynamic games: Games in extensive form. Nash equilibria. Backward induction and Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. Applications. Repeated games. Applications.
Part II – Games of incomplete information.
3. Static games. Normal form representation. Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Applications.
Core Documentation
Martin J. Osborne, An Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press. 2003 or later editions.Type of delivery of the course
Class lectures, also with weakly discussions of problems and applications.Type of evaluation
A mid term exam for students attending classes and a final exam. Both exams are written, closed books.