In the first part of the seminar we’ll discuss basic elements of economic analysis of public law, known as public choice theory. In our first meeting we’ll identify two distinct public choice theories—“a public interest” approach (aka Madisonianism or “republicanism”) vs. “public of interests” view (aka “pluralism”). Under the former, decision-makers should base their decisions on “public reason” (in the Rawlsian sense) rather than on self-interest. The aim of public law is to ensure that decision-making is based on impartial considerations. In contrast, the competing theory reflects a welfarist approach, under which the desired social decisions are those that maximize some social welfare function. In general, it endorses a decentralized approach, in which the social decision is achieved by aggregating the relevant persons’ interests and preferences. Accordingly, the aim of public law under this view is to ensure that decisions accurately aggregate the various interests of those affected. We will discuss the central normative and behavioral aspects of each of these theories. In subsequent meetings we will explore some of their implementations in public choice theory and in public law doctrines, regarding four central types of decision-makers: the public, representatives, the Executive Branch and the judiciary.